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Abstract  A mixed factorial design of 2x2x2 was applied (sequence x law x affirmation) to evaluate the effects of prior 
affirmative representation on the subsequent processing of compound negation. The sequence factor was defined to perform 
between-subjects comparisons. The other two factors, that is, logic law and prior affirmation were defined as within-subjects 
factors. The sequence factor was included to evaluate potential artifacts generated by the experimental design. Statistical 
analyses showed the absence of such artifacts. Three dependent variables were included: response type, an indirect measure 
of introspection quality, and a direct measure of subjective difficulty. A random sample of 130 participants were recruited for 
this experiment. All the participants were undergraduate students at the National University of Entre Rios, Argentina. 112 
were female (86.2%). The mean age was 23.79 years old (SD = 6.452). 2 sets of 6 exercises each were given to all the 
participants. The classical selection paradigm was applied, that is, four response options were given in each item. Only one of 
them was the normative response according to logic (DeMorgan’s equivalences for negated conjunctions and negated 
disjunctions). One set included prior relevant affirmation before requiring negation, the other set started straightforward with 
the negation task. The task was to find the logical meaning of such compound negation that operated on a conjunction or a 
disjunction. By the other side, the set of exercises without prior affirmation asked straightforward to find the equivalence for 
a given compound negation of a conjunction or a disjunction. After completing each set of 6 responses participants were 
asked to give an opinion about their own performance (introspection quality) and about the task difficulty (subjective 
difficulty). In consistence with the mental models theory and the relevance theory, prior affirmation increased the frequency 
of normative responses and the quality of introspection. However, a direct registry of task difficulty showed no difference 
between a prior affirmation condition and a straightforward condition in consistence with the Gricean view of negation. An 
unexpected result showed an incremental effect of normative responses for the negation of conjunctions in comparison with 
the negation of disjunctions when prior affirmation provided a pragmatically enriched context. These results are discussed in 
terms of working memory dynamics. In sum, our findings suggest that the processing of compound negation of conjunctions 
and disjunctions can be explained as a combination of explicit and implicit processes that are strongly influenced by 
pragmatic factors. 
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1. Introduction 
Negation is a key feature of natural language [1]. The 
importance of negation has been extensively acknowledged 
by philosophers [2], linguists [3], logicians [4], and 
psychologists [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Negation has been defined in 
mathematical logic as an abstract function that reverses the 
truth value of a given sentence [10]. For example, given the 
sentence p: “Africa is a continent”, its negation would be 
not p: “It is not the case that Africa is a continent”. In this  
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example, p is a true sentence. Therefore, not p is a false 
sentence. Conversely, the negation of a false sentence yields 
a true sentence.  
One of the current concerns of the theories of negation is 
to explain the sequential relation between prior affirmation 
and subsequent negation. More specifically, two core 
questions need to be answered. First, is there an effect of 
prior affirmative representation on subsequent negation? 
Does such effect exist at all? Second, if the effect does exist, 
which variables shall be included in an evidence-based 
description and explanation? This article aims to contribute 
plausible answers to these questions. We aim to prove that 
prior affirmation representation does increase normative 
responses and introspection quality, but does not affect the 
subjective registry of difficulty for the particular case of 
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compound negations. This aim is consistent with current 
studies that shifted their perspective from a binary view to a 
gradient view of the effort required to process negation 
[11]. 
This article continues as follows. First, we outline the 
main psychological advances in the study of the 
representation and inferential processing of compound 
negation. In particular, we highlight the theoretical and 
empirical contributions of the mental models theory of 
human thinking and a core insight of dual-process theories 
focused on implicit processes. Then, we comment on 
linguistic contributions concerned with cooperation and 
relevance in current pragmatics. Next, we apply the 
distinction between implicit and explicit processes of 
negation proposed by dual-process perspectives [12, 13] to 
the particular case of conjunctions and disjunctions. 
Afterwards, we derive our working hypotheses from the 
reviewed accounts and introduce a mixed experimental 
design to test them. Finally, we discuss our findings and 
propose further studies based on complementary measures.  
1.1. Mental Models of Compound Negation 
Early contributions by Wason and Johnson-Laird [14] 
found a psychological interaction between the polarity of a 
sentence, i.e. its affirmative or negative condition, and its 
truth value, i.e. its true or false condition. These authors 
found that negative sentences are harder to deal with than 
false sentences. They also found that the evaluation of false 
affirmations requires more time than true affirmations, but 
the evaluation of false negations is faster than the evaluation 
of true negations. The latter result has been described as “odd” 
[15, p. 436]. However, the mental models theory provided an 
account for this phenomenon that relates the processing 
times to the number of possibilities corresponding to each 
sentential case [15, 16, 17]. That is, humans do not reason 
like a universal Turing machine [18] by applying formal 
rules [19]. The evidence suggests that human reason 
proceeds by representing possibilities and using 
counterexamples to evaluate consistency [20, 21] and to 
distinguish between biconditionals, conditionals, and 
intention conditionals [22]. In the same line of research, the 
negation of compounds has been found particularly difficult 
to understand by individuals with no training in logic [6, 7, 8]. 
A compound sentence is a molecular expression that can be 
parsed into atomic sentences, which do not include 
connectives or the operator of negation. Conjunctions and 
disjunctions are examples of compound sentences. For 
instance, “Africa is a continent and London is a city” is a 
compound sentence because the conjunctive operator “and” 
connects the atomic sentence “Africa is a continent” with the 
atomic sentence “London is a city”. In a similar manner the 
word “or” operates in disjunctions [10]. Recent contributions 
by Khemlani et al. [6, 7] postulated a novel account for the 
cognitive processing of sentential negation in the context of 
the mental models theory of human thinking [15, 16]. This 
theory attributes a critical role to the working memory load 
during reasoning [23]. The heavier the load is, the poorer the 
performance in negation tasks would be. This might happen 
because the mental representation of the possibilities 
expressed in sentences would require multiple computations 
that include iconic representations but also an abstract 
representation of negation [24]. A broad prediction that can 
be derived from the mental models theory states that the 
reduction of working memory load facilitates the processing 
of negation [7, Prediction 4]. We suggest that one way to 
produce such reduction consists in presenting prior 
affirmative sentences before requiring the negation of the 
same sentences.  
1.2. Relevance, Cooperation, and Pragmatics of Negation 
Several contributions from cognitive pragmatics found 
facilitation effects when prior information is presented 
before requesting negation [25, 26]. In the context of the 
relevance theory proposed by Sperber and Wilson [27, 28] 
negations are not automatic, they rather require different 
computational demands. Furthermore, relevance is defined 
as a function of cognitive effort and contextual effects such 
that the greater the effort, the lesser the relevance [29, 30]. 
Consequently, the reduction of such effort would produce 
better performances in negation tasks. By the opposite, the 
pragmatic theory of Grice [31, 32] and the neo-Gricean 
linguists like Levinson [33] suggest that the processing of 
negation in conversational contexts is automatic and 
effortless [3]. This would particularly occur with scalar 
inferences, which are cognitive phenomena activated by 
utterances that use terms like “some” to imply “not all” [26], 
e.g. “Some politicians are honest”. Therefore, the working 
memory reduction obtained through the presentation of prior 
affirmative sentences would produce no effect on the 
processing of subsequent compound negation according to 
the Gricean theory. This would happen because proper 
communication occurs only if a standard set of principles 
and maxims are assumed [31]. The cooperation between 
speaker and hearer would guarantee a sound understanding. 
A low effort or no effort at all would be needed. This would 
happen even when many inferences were required to produce 
a sophisticated meaning completion [30].  
1.3. Explicit and Implicit Processes of Negation 
From these theoretical convergences and divergences 
between cognitive and pragmatic theories, different patterns 
of introspective processing can be predicted. If the 
processing of negation is automatic like the Gricean 
perspectives suggest, then no subjective difference in 
difficulty should be explicitly noted between negation 
preceded by affirmation and straightforward negation. 
However, the prior affirmation condition might promote a 
facilitation effect based on working memory reduction. 
According to the mental models theory, such effect might be 
accessible through introspection at some degree. This would 
happen because subjects might notice the online load of her 
or his own working memory. We argue that these predictions 
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are not contradictory because implicit and explicit processes 
can be distinguished in the processing of negation [34]. An 
explicit measure might evidence no difference in subjective 
difficulty but an implicit measure might provide an 
introspective notice of working memory alleviation in the 
prior affirmation condition. Recent introspective or 
metacognitive studies are consistent with this conjectured 
relation between introspection quality and performance   
[35, 36]. Although some of these results have been objected 
after reanalysis using Bayesian methods [37], the link 
between performance improvement and introspection 
promotion has been detected in multiple domains [38]. In the 
field of deduction, the relevance of introspective processes 
has been early acknowledged [14] and recently accounted for 
in conditional reasoning [39, 40]. More specifically, the 
cognitive fluency has been understood as a metacognitive 
process akin to the meta-memory feeling-of-knowing 
phenomenon [41]. It has been found that such fluency plays a 
critical role in the generation of distortions like the matching 
bias in the Wason selection task [42]. In the field of insight 
problem solving a recent study conducted by Ball et al. [43] 
found better performances when implicit processes are 
facilitated. 
2. Method 
An experiment was conducted to study the effects of prior 
affirmation on the subsequent processing of compound 
negation. We aimed to detect such effects and to propose 
three dependent variables to capture important aspects of 
negation, i.e. normative responses, an explicit registry of 
subjective difficulty, and an implicit measure of 
introspection quality. 
The compound sentences selected to achieve this aim were 
negations of conjunctions or disjunctions constructed 
according to DeMorgan’s laws of logic [4, 8, 44]. 
DeMorgan’s law 1 states that the negation of a conjunction is 
equivalent to a disjunction. DeMorgan’s law 2 states that the 
negation of a disjunction is equivalent to a conjunction. 
Formally, for law 1 “not (p and q) is logically equivalent to 
(not p or not q)”. For law 2 “not (p or q) is equivalent to (not 
p and not q)”. The letters p and q represent a sentence, which 
is any proposition or utterance associated to a truth value 
(true or false, but not both) according to Suppes and Hill [10]. 
The use of norms like DeMorgan’s laws has been recently 
debated [45] and considered necessary in reasoning research 
[46, 47]. 
2.1. Participants 
A random sample of 130 Social Sciences students at the 
National University of Entre Ríos, Argentina, were recruited 
for this experiment. 112 were female (86.2%). The mean age 
was 23.79 years old (SD = 6.452). All the participants gave 
an informed consent before taking part in the experiment. No 
reward was given for participation. None of the participants 
received formal training in logic or mathematics as part of 
their university studies.  
2.2. Materials and Procedure 
2 sets of 6 exercises each were given to all the participants. 
One set included prior relevant affirmation before requiring 
negation, the other set started straightforward with the 
negation task. Tables 1 and 2 introduce examples of such 
tasks.  
Table 1.  Task Example for Prior Affirmation before Negation 
Instructions: please read carefully each sentence below. A question 
is presented about a daily situation. You are requested to select the 
option that you consider correct. Only one of the options is a better 
response than the others according to logic. 
Helmut visited London city as a tourist. He planned for his last day 
in that city to visit the Buckingham Palace and the Tower of 
London. However, he realized that he did not have enough time to 
visit both places. In consistence with his situation, which possibility 
do you think that remained to him? 
□ a) Not visiting the Tower of London and not visiting the 
Buckingham Palace. 
□ b) Not visiting the Tower of London or not visiting the 
Buckingham Palace.* 
□ c) If he didn’t visit the Tower of London, then he didn’t visit the 
Buckingham Palace. 
□ d) Not visiting the Tower of London or else not visiting the 
Buckingham Palace. 
Note: The symbol * shows the correct response according to DeMorgan’s 
law 1. 
Table 2.  Task Example for Straightforward Negation 
Instructions: please find the sentence in small letters that is 
equivalent to the sentence in capital letters. Two sentences are 
equivalent when they have the same meaning, that is, when they 
express exactly the same idea. Only one of the four response options 
is correct according to logic. 
IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT: LONDON IS A CITY AND 
AFRICA IS A CONTINENT 
□ a) London is not a city and Africa is not a continent. 
□ b) London is not a city or Africa is not a continent. * 
□ c) If London is not a city, then Africa is not a continent. 
□ d) London is not a city or else Africa is not a continent. 
Note: The symbol * shows the correct response according to DeMorgan’s 
law 1. 
The prior affirmation set of exercises started with the 
description of a daily situation presented in a colloquial 
manner. For example, “Helmut visited London city as a 
tourist. He planned for his last day in that city to visit the 
Buckingham Palace and the Tower of London”. Then, a 
sentence operated the negation of such prior affirmation, e.g. 
“However, he realized that he did not have enough time to 
visit both places”. The task was to find the logical meaning 
of such negation that operated on a conjunction or a 
disjunction, i.e. “In consistence with his situation, which 
possibility do you think that remained to him?” (See Table 1 
for response options).  
In the other side, the set of exercises without prior 
affirmation asked straightforward to find the equivalence for 
a given compound negation of a conjunction or a disjunction 
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as is shown in Table 2. The straightforward set of exercises 
used in this experiment has been previously employed in a 
similar experiment that tested other predictions derived from 
the mental models theory [8].  
The atomic truth values for both sets were TF (i.e. true and 
false), FT, and FF. That is, we used a trimmed truth table that 
excluded the TT case for both DeMorgan’s laws. This 
exclusion was applied because in a pilot study we found that 
some participants evaluated only the atomic values and 
neglected the evaluation of connectives [8]. Such strategy 
was applied to reduce a potential contribution of a 
belief-bias-like phenomenon to the response selections [48], 
which was not a specific aim of this experiment and would 
have introduced a confound effect.  
To further study possible confound learning effects two 
groups were defined. One group received first the prior 
affirmation set and then the straightforward negation set. The 
other group received the straightforward negation set first 
and then the prior affirmation set. No differences were 
expected between these groups, which can be interpreted as 
the absence of learning effects.  
Each exercise in both sets included a main negation and 
four possible equivalences of such negation. Only one of 
these four options was correct according to DeMorgan’s 
laws. The task was to evaluate the sentences and select one of 
them. In all the exercises the same four abstract forms were 
given as response options, that is: a) “not p and not q”, b) 
“not p or not q”, c) “if not p, then not q”, d) “not p or else not 
q”. The letters p and q represent atomic sentences that vary 
across exercises. The normative response for DeMorgan’s 
law 1 was option b, and for law 2 was option a in this 
sequence. Option a is a conjunction, option b is an inclusive 
disjunction, option c is a conditional, and option d is an 
exclusive disjunction. DeMorgan’s laws are normative for 
the inclusive disjunction, but not for the exclusive 
disjunction [10]. Tables 1 and 2 introduced examples for law 
1. Examples and analyses for law 2 concerned with 
erroneous response patterns have been discussed in Macbeth 
et al. [8]. The sequence of exercises within each set was 
randomized and the response options sequence within each 
exercise was randomized as well. This double randomization 
was performed for each participant. Between both sets a 
distractor task was introduced. A ten items shortened version 
of the Big-Five Personality Inventory was administered [49].  
These tasks were administered in groups of 20 to 30 
students in the classroom during a regular class with the 
permission of the corresponding authorities. The tasks were 
presented in paper-and-pencil using individual booklets, 
which also served for collecting responses. The experiment 
was conducted in Spanish. For all the participants, Spanish 
was their mother tongue. The complete experimental 
sessions took around 25 minutes each.  
After completing each set of 6 responses, participants 
were asked to give an opinion about their own performance. 
They answered the question: How many of your 6 last 
responses do you think are correct? This response provided a 
subjective estimation of success that was used to compare 
with the objective success to generate a raw index of 
introspection quality or calibration [36]. The objective 
success was the sum of normative responses according to 
DeMorgan’s laws. The introspection quality index was 
calculated for each set and for each participant (introspection 
quality = subjective success - objective success). This 
indirect measure was aimed to capture a possible implicit 
facilitation effect in consistence with the dual-process 
theories or thinking [12, 13].  
Two additional response vectors were generated. An 
explicit estimation of subjective difficulty was requested 
after each set of negations. Participants answered the 
question: How difficult was this set of 6 exercises for you? 
Responses were requested under the form of integers ranging 
from 0 to 10, being 0 the lowest difficulty and 10 the highest 
difficulty.  
2.3. Experimental Hypotheses  
Hypothesis H1 states that the frequency of normative 
responses for the cognitive processing of compound 
negations of conjunctions and disjunctions increases when 
prior affirmation is presented before requiring their negation. 
Hypothesis H2 states that introspection quality for the 
processing of compound negations of conjunctions and 
disjunctions increases when prior affirmation is presented 
before requiring their negation. Hypothesis H3 states that 
prior affirmation does not reduce the subjective difficulty 
when compared to straightforward negation’s subjective 
difficulty. Hypotheses H1 and H3 are concerned with 
explicit registries while H2 aims to evaluate an implicit 
process.  
2.4. Design and Analyses 
A mixed factorial design of 2x2x2 was applied (sequence 
x law x affirmation). The sequence factor was defined to 
perform between-subjects comparisons. The other two 
factors, i.e. logic law and prior affirmation were defined as 
within-subjects factors. The sequence factor was included to 
evaluate potential artifacts generated by the experimental 
design. In particular, unwanted learning effect. The 
within-subjects factors were included to test the 
experimental hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.  
Two conditions were defined for the sequence factor. One 
condition received first the prior affirmations set followed by 
the straightforward set (N = 61). The other condition 
received the prior affirmations set in second place after 
receiving the straightforward set (N = 69). The law factor 
had two conditions, one for DeMorgan’s law 1 and the other 
for DeMorgan’s law 2. The affirmation factor had two 
conditions, one for prior affirmation and the other for 
straightforward negation. If the sequence factor yields no 
difference, then both groups (N = 130) can be considered as 
stemming from the same population. In that case, the design 
can be reduced to a 2x2 within-subjects experiment suitable 
for factorial comparisons of law (law 1, law 2) and 
affirmation (prior affirmation, straightforward negation).  
Three dependent variables were defined, i.e. normative 
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responses, introspection quality, and subjective difficulty to 
test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 respectively. Correct or 
normative responses were the sum per participant of the 
selected options that were consistent with DeMorgan’s laws. 
Normative responses were computed separately for law 1 
and law 2. Introspection quality was defined as the difference 
between the subjective success and the objective success 
through the index introduced above [36]. The lower such 
difference is, the higher the quality of introspection is. This 
happens because the index increases when the distance 
between the subjective registry and the objective registry 
becomes greater. Subjective difficulty was the direct 
response given by each participant to the question concerned 
with difficulty that followed each set of exercises. .  
2.5. Results and Discussion 
Before testing the experimental hypotheses, two 
evaluations were performed to study the reliability of the 
experimental design and procedure. The first evaluation was 
concerned with possible gender differences. The second 
evaluation was needed to reject a possible learning effect that 
could bring unwanted variability to the dependent variables. 
Dependent variables’ vectors resulted incompatible with the 
normality assumption according to the Shapiro-Wilk test and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For both laws, normative 
responses, introspection quality, and difficulty yielded p 
values close to zero for the mentioned tests. Therefore, 
robust statistics were applied both for significance testing 
and effect size estimation [50, 51].  
No gender differences were found for the negations tasks. 
We performed separate tests between female and male 
participants for each law and for each affirmation condition 
within each law (Mann-Whitney U test ps above .41 with 
effect sizes close to zero using Cliff’s Delta). Consequently, 
female and male participants were further pooled as 
stemming from the same population for statistical analyses. 
As expected, we neither found sequence differences using 
the same strategy (ps above .101, Cliff’s Deltas close to zero 
for separate Mann-Whitney U tests). This result suggests that 
no learning effect was generated. Accordingly, both groups 
were further treated as stemming from the same population 
to test the experimental hypotheses. 
Hypothesis H1 resulted consistent with the evidence. The 
introduction of prior affirmation before negation increased 
the frequency of normative responses. Figure 1 presents a 
visual representation of this result and Table 3 summarizes 
the corresponding statistical tests. The prior affirmation 
effect size resulted large for law 1 and about medium for law 
2. 
 
Note: Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval for the mean of normative responses. N = 130. 
Figure 1.  Prior affirmation versus straightforward negation 
  
 
210 Guillermo Macbeth et al.:  Prior Affirmative Representation Facilitates  
the Cognitive Processing of Compound Negation 
Table 3.  Statistical Tests of Prior Affirmation Effect 
 Law 1 Law 2 
 Straightforward Negation Prior Affirmation Straightforward Negation Prior Affirmation 
Mean (SD) 0.20 (0.472) 2.24 (0.913) 1.18 (1.256) 1.74 (0.629) 
z -10.148 -2.948 
p <.001 .003 
|δ| .896 .278 
Effect Size large about medium 
Note: The reported z statistic corresponds to the Sign test. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) are reported for normative 
responses in the first row. N = 130. The |δ| corresponds to the Cliff’s Delta absolute value effect size, which is small when greater 
than .147, medium around .33 and large around .474 [52].  
Hypothesis H2 resulted compatible with the evidence. A 
raw calibration paradigm was applied for the evaluation of 
the introspection quality [53]. Calibration is here understood 
as the relation between the subjective success (i.e. 
experimental subject’s opinion about her or his own 
performance) and the objective success (i.e. her or his actual 
performance). Calibration was computed as the difference 
between the former and the latter for each subject in each set 
of exercises. When calibration came close to zero, the 
subject was considered as well calibrated. In the contrary, 
when calibration departed from zero the subject was 
considered as not well calibrated. When such departures 
generated significant differences between the subjective 
success and the objective success, the presence of a 
calibration bias was operationally defined. In calibration 
research the overconfidence bias occurs when the subjective 
success results greater than the objective success [53, 54]. 
That is, the subject performed poorer than she or he thinks. 
To obtain more fine-grained comparisons between these 
biases, the estimation of robust effect sizes was applied using 
the absolute value of Cliff’s Delta [50, 51]. As expected, a 
reduction in effect size for the overconfidence bias was 
observed for the prior affirmation condition as it is shown in 
Table 4 (from large to small effect sizes). A statistical test 
was further applied to compare calibration between these 
conditions. The difference in calibration resulted significant 
between prior affirmation and straightforward conditions 
(Sign test, z (130) = -9.037, p < .001, |Cliff’s δ| = .769, large 
effect size). These results are consistent with hypothesis H2 
because subjects increased their introspection quality when 
prior affirmative mental models were constructed before 
their negation. 
In consistence with H3 the subjective estimation of 
difficulty yielded no difference (Wilcoxon Signed rank test, 
V (130) = 3595, p = .576, |Cliff’s δ| = .008, close to null effect 
size) between the prior affirmation set (mean = 5.708, SD = 
2.304) and the straightforward set (mean = 5.485, SD = 
2.286). This result suggests that the overall reasoning 
process was perceived as equally difficult in both sets of 
exercises independently from the introspective quality 
increase generated in the prior affirmation condition 
captured by hypothesis H2. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the observed facilitation effect activates 
different cognitive processes with different degrees of 
introspective accessibility. A working memory load 
reduction might be implicitly noticed according to H2. 
However, an explicit registry of the corresponding difficulty 
reduction was not available according to H3. This result is 
consistent with current views of negation as a complex set of 
cognitive and linguistic processes that can be placed in a 
theoretical gradient of effort [11] rather than being 
all-or-nothing phenomena. 
Table 4.  Statistical Tests of Introspective Quality Increase 
 Straighforward Negation Prior-Affirmation 
Subjective Success 4.75 (1.448) 4.55 (1.324) 
Objective Success 1.38 (1.338) 3.98 (1.229) 
Calibration 3.36 (1.826) 0.58 (1.446) 
p <.001 <.001 
|Cliff’s δ| .871 .25 
Effect size large small 
Note: The quality of the introspective monitoring increases when calibration 
approaches to zero. The robust z tests and effect sizes reported here 
correspond to the comparison between subjective and objective success 
within subjects. The first three rows report Means and Standard Deviations, 
the latter in parenthesis. N = 130. 
One unexpected result was observed in the prior 
affirmation condition. For the straightforward negation, law 
1 resulted harder than law 2 in consistence with previous 
findings [7, 44]. That is, the negation of a conjunction is 
usually harder to process than the negation of a disjunction 
when no prior affirmation is presented [6]. However, the 
introduction of prior affirmation reversed the frequency of 
normative responses between DeMorgan’s laws. This novel 
result cannot be explained with the evidence collected in this 
experiment, nor has been specifically predicted by the 
accounts of negation introduced in the first section. Further 
research is needed to evaluate why such reversal effect 
occurs. One possible line of exploration might consider the 
working memory dynamics [15, 16, 20]. That is, the 
affirmative representation of one mental model in law 
1demands less memory consumption than the affirmative 
representation of three mental models in law 2. The 
remaining working memory would arrive more relieved to 
the subsequent negation step in law 1 than in law 2. 
Consequently, more normative responses can be expected 
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for the former than for the latter as can be seen between grey 
bars in Figure 1 (Sign test, z (130) = -5.661, p < .001, |Cliff’s 
δ| = .378, medium effect size). 
3. General Discussion 
Several theories of negation suggest that working memory 
modulates the representation and inference of negative 
sentences [6]. This conjecture has been proposed by the 
mental models theory [7, 8, 9, 21], and the relevance theory 
[25, 26, 27, 28]. In the opposite, the pragmatic theory of 
Grice [31, 32] and similar views proposed by neo-Gricean 
linguists like Levinson [33] suggest that negations in some 
conversational contexts are processed automatically and 
without effort. The experimental evidence obtained in our 
study suggests that working memory load actually modulates 
the processing of compound negations for conjunctions and 
disjunctions. Our evidence also supports a cognitive view 
that includes implicit and explicit processes. The 
introduction of prior affirmation promoted better 
performances in a negation task constructed according to 
DeMorgan’s laws. Introspection quality also improved when 
prior affirmation was presented before negation according to 
an implicit measure that captured an overconfidence bias 
reduction. However, the subjective difficulty did not 
significantly decrease when such facilitation effect occurred. 
This facilitation effect promoted by implicit processes has 
been described as a robust phenomenon in insight problem 
solving tasks [43]. 
Concerning H1, the frequency increase in normative 
responses generated in our experiment by prior affirmation 
can be considered consistent with several studies that 
alleviated the working memory load by prior presentation of 
relevant utterances. Bott and Noveck [25] found that such 
procedure promoted the generation of correct inferences in 
scalar implicatures. Similarly, Orenes et al. [9] generated 
eye-tracking evidence supporting a facilitation effect for the 
processing of sentential negation introduced after prior 
affirmation in the context of the visual world paradigm. Two 
different processes of negation were identified in the latter 
study conducted by Orenes and colleagues, one for bipolar 
alternatives contexts, and one for multiple alternatives 
contexts. Gaze fixations focused on the alternative item in 
bipolar contexts but focused on the denied item in contexts 
that provided several options. This result that extends 
previous behavioural findings [55] has been interpreted as an 
avoidance strategy of working memory overload in 
consistence with the mental models theory [15, 56]. The 
evidence obtained in the present study is consistent with such 
view.  
The formalist theories of reasoning like the Psychology of 
Proof or PSYCOP [57] do not provide specific predictions 
for the effects of prior affirmation on the subsequent 
processing of negation. Generally, the formalist theories 
suggest that sentences are first translated into a mental logic 
or formal code, then operated according to abstract rules, and 
finally translated back to words to construct new sentences 
[58]. The mental models theory, by contrast, suggests that 
reasoning depends heavily on the representation of 
possibilities consistent with a given set of sentences and the 
further search of counterexamples [15, 16, 17]. Such 
representation processing requires the active participation of 
working memory [8]. Furthermore, for the particular case of 
DeMorgan’s laws the mental models account predicts that 
law 1 should be harder than law 2 for the straightforward 
negation condition [6]. PSYCOP predicts the opposite 
asymmetry or no difference at all between law 1 and law 2 
[57]. In our experiment, normative responses for law 1 
(mean = 0.20, SD = 0.472) resulted less frequent (Sign test, z 
(130) = -6.154, p < .001, |Cliff’s δ| = .438, about large effect 
size) than normative responses for law 2 (mean = 1.18, SD = 
1.256) when no prior affirmation was presented. This result 
(see Figure 1) replicates previous findings in consistence 
with the mental models theory of negation [7, 8] and 
contradicts the predictions of PSYCOP.  
Concerning H2, the improvement of introspection quality 
observed in our experiment can be considered consistent 
with previous studies that generated more adjusted 
calibration through the introduction of prior relevant 
information in decision making tasks [59] or training in 
specific-domain tasks that involve prior affirmations and 
feedback [36]. The fluency, i.e. acceleration of response 
times [40, 60], under prior affirmation versus straightforward 
negation conditions needs to be inspected deeper in future 
experiments. Particularly, more evidence is needed to 
account for the implicit improvement of introspection quality 
through alternative metacognitive measures [39].  
Concerning H3, we applied a classic distinction between 
implicit and explicit processes of negation. Such distinction 
follows the dual-process theories of thinking that describe 
the implicit processes as autonomous and typically 
correlated to automaticity. By the opposite, the explicit 
processes are described as requiring working memory 
consumption and being partially conscious [12, 13]. In the 
field of pragmatics, one of the main differences between the 
relevance theory [27, 28] and the Gricean theories [31, 32, 33] 
is concerned with the processing effort required to the hearer 
when interpreting an utterance produced by the speaker [61]. 
The intended meaning is inferred by default in the Gricean 
perspective. This would happen because an adequate 
communication is regulated by a principle of cooperation 
and several maxims that guarantee the understanding 
between speaker and hearer [32]. Grice’s maxim of manner 
states that the hearer expects clarity and “reasonable dispatch” 
[31, page 47] from the speaker. Therefore, the interpretation 
facilitation for the hearer stems from the cooperative setting 
itself. Otherwise, the communication is rejected according to 
the Gricean view. By the opposite, the inference of meaning 
might require different levels of effort from the hearer in the 
relevance theory [11, 27, 28]. Our results support the 
relevance theory for implicit processes and the Gricean 
theory for explicit processes of negation. Although the 
facilitation effect in normative responses did occur (H1) and 
the overconfidence bias reduction did also occur (H2), no 
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explicit difference was found for the subjective difficulty 
between prior affirmation and straightforward negation (H3). 
Therefore, we found an unnoticed facilitation effect. This 
phenomenon is consistent with the dual-process view that 
differentiates between explicit and implicit processes 
according to the working memory demands [12, 13]. A 
higher demand triggers explicit and effortful processes while 
a lower demand correlates with automaticity, that is, implicit 
and effortless processing [62].  
Our findings are consistent with the production of 
negation heuristics as was predicted by Khemlani et al. [6] 
and with the occurrence of reasoning biases as was 
extensively accounted for by dual-process theories [12, 13, 
29, 63]. Similarly, the cognitive processing of 
straightforward compound negation has been recently 
described as shallow and akin to a matching-bias-like 
phenomenon [64] as was discovered and explained by Evans 
and colleagues [65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. Furthermore, Evans 
et al. [34] provided strong evidence for the distinction 
between implicit and explicit processes of negation in the 
context of conditional reasoning. Our results with compound 
negation tasks support the same distinction for 
biconditionals constructed according to DeMorgan’s laws.  
Further studies are needed to evaluate the unexpected 
reversal effect observed in our experiment (see Figure 1). We 
suggest that this result is consistent with a working memory 
dynamics conjecture. However, more experiments are 
required to test this hypothesis. One strategy that can be 
applied with this aim is to manipulate the concurrent 
working memory load [71].  
One limitation of our study is concerned with the lack of 
response time records to obtain complementary evidence. 
More time would be needed to process DeMorgan’s law 1 
than DeMorgan’s law 2. However, other critical modulatory 
factors like meaning, reference, and context shall be taken 
into account [6]. A further exploration of our findings can be 
performed through eye-tracking methods [72, 73]. 
Inspection times, fixations, and revisits to areas of interest 
are dependent variables that might provide complementary 
evidence for our findings. A previous eye-tracking 
experiment that collected both eye-tracking measures and 
ERPs obtained results that can be considered consistent with 
such strategy [74]. Greater pupil dilation can be expected for 
the straightforward condition than for the prior affirmation 
condition because memory load contributes to such dilation 
[75].  
Several studies conducted in the general field of reasoning 
[37] and in the specific field of sentential reasoning [74] 
found thematic effects that may also be present in our study. 
The robust phenomenon of belief bias can be understood as 
the tendency to select responses that are consistent with the 
world knowledge or beliefs of the experimental subjects  
[48, 68]. This tendency has been observed independently of 
the experimental instructions [60]. In other words, factual 
sentences are more frequently selected than counterfactual 
sentences in reasoning tasks regardless of the requested task. 
To evaluate the possible presence of this effect in our study 
we examined factuality in the straightforward condition. By 
the other side, the prior affirmation condition employed a set 
of hypothetical situations for which the factual versus 
counterfactual distinction cannot be applied (e.g. “Helmut 
visited London as a tourist” is a hypothetical or fictional 
rather than a factual utterance). The straightforward 
condition included 6 negations, among which 3 were 
conjunctions and 3 were disjunctions. All the conjunctions 
were true compound sentences. The set of disjunctions 
included 2 counterfactual sentences and 1 factual. No 
significant differences (Sign test, z (130) = -1.784, p = .074, 
|Cliff’s δ| = .007, close to null effect size) in normative 
responses were found between the 2 pooled counterfactuals 
(mean = 0.37, SD = 0.439) and the factual (mean = 0.45, SD 
= 0.50). This finding suggests that removing TT cases from 
our experimental materials was an adequate strategy to 
reduce or avoid the belief bias effect. This is noteworthy 
because the study of belief bias was not aimed. The trimmed 
truth table that we used in our experiment promoted response 
patterns that can be attributed to the processes of negation 
rather than promoting confound effects between negation 
and belief. No statistical comparisons were performed 
between factual and counterfactual sentences pooling 
conjunctions and disjunctions in the same test because 
DeMorgan’s laws 1 and 2 have shown different normative 
response patterns in previous studies [7, 8]. Taken together, 
these results suggest that belief bias did not occur in our 
experiment. The same phenomenon was observed in a recent 
experiment that tested other mental models’ hypotheses but 
applied similar materials [8].  
In sum, our study suggests that the introduction of prior 
affirmative representation before negation facilitates the 
cognitive processing of negative compound sentences 
constructed according to DeMorgan ʾs laws.  
phenomenon has been accounted for by the mental models 
theory in psychology [6, 7], and by the relevance theory in 
pragmatics [27, 28]. The proposed distinction between 
implicit and explicit processes of negation follows the 
dual-process theories of thinking [12, 13, 34, 43, 76]. The 
explicit evaluation of subjective difficulty resulted consistent 
with the Gricean pragmatics [31, 32]. More research is 
needed to achieve a stronger evaluation of these findings. 
Particularly, more experimental evidence is required to 
understand the unexpected reversion effect between 
normative responses for DeMorgan’s laws triggered by prior 
affirmative representation.  
4. Conclusions 
To conclude, our findings suggest that the processing of 
compound negation of conjunctions and disjunctions can be 
explained as a combination of explicit and implicit processes 
that are strongly influenced by pragmatic factors.  
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